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by Graciela Chichilnisky*
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Abstract
The paper explores the impacts of resource export policies on major
macro variables of the exporter and the importer economies . There are two
regions, North and South, trading resources for industrial goods . Each
region consumes two goods (basic consumption goods and industrial goods) and
produces both using three inputs : capital labor and resources . The relative
prices in five markets (of factors and goods) as well as the volumes of out-
put, consumption and international trade are all determined endogenously at
a general equilibrium .
The results give conditions both for positive and for negative outcomes
from moves towards world equilibrium with higher volumes of resource exports .
Under certain conditions, increased resource exports produce price distortions
with negative consequences . When the South's technologies are dual and its
traditional sector uses mostly labor, and the North has a more homogeneous
economy and a high rate of profit, at the new equilibrium real wages, employ-
ment and consumption decrease in the South, and its terms of trade and real
revenues worsen . This is traced to the negative impact of increased resource
exports on the domestic terms of trade between the traditional and the in-
dustrial sectors . However, the profits of the south increase, thus explaining
in part the existence of trade . More favourable outcomes are obtained when
the exporting economy is more homogeneous, and sufficient conditions are
given for an export policy to improve the welfare of the exporting country,
as well as its international terms of trade and export revenues .
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I Introduction
This paper explores the impacts of resource export policies on major
macro variables of the exporting and importing economies. These impacts are
traced through the accompanying changes in international terms of trade and in
total. real revenues . The paper thus belongs to the increasing body of
literature on macro analysis of open economies (e .g . (1), (2), (5)) as well
as to more recent general equilibrium analysis of resource export policies
(3), (6), (7) .
The aim is to explcre some relatively complex issues involved in North-
South trade, The two trading regions have
therefore macro characteristics of industrial and of developing
countries . The resource exporting region has a dual structure, and its
traditional sector uses mostly labor, and very few capital or oil inputs .
The industrial economy is more integrated, and uses more homogeneous technologies ;
it does not produce resources . For completeness, however, one of the results
(theorem 3) relates to the case where the resource importer is also a developing
country .
	
.
T'.e policy problems explored here are common to ar extnnsine iitcrt_ture on resource
trade, a literature that has gained increasing attention in recent years as the
economic role of resources has become more visible, and it became apparent that the
macro analysis of resource policies is less than perfectly understood by
conventional one country one sector macro models where inputs are capital, labor
and produced goods .
But we study here resource export policies with a particular set of
problems in mind: hose that are typical of a developing country that trades its
resources with an industrial country in exchange for industrial goods . The
problem is somewhat peculiar, its most striking characteristic being perhaps
that there exists a problem at all . This is in part because the issues involved
are difficult to appreciate when analysed through the prism of conventional
development models, and we discuss this next .
Resource exporting is an activity that tends to bypass most of the
economic engine of a developing country : the production of resources does
not employ domestic factors significantly, nor do resources represent a
significant input of production in the economy, especially in the
traditional sector on whose output frost wage income is spent.
In'this sense, resources represent almost a "pure rent" good : they are almost
costlessly extracted, and extracted largely for exports . The
revenue obtained from this almost costless operation is then added to the
country's balance of payments surplus . Thus a resource exporting developing
country need not be subject to the 'worst enemy' of development according to
traditional economic models : the balance of payments deficit.
	
If resources are
abundant, and they are traded for industrial goods, there are in principle no constrai:
for the developing country's growth perspective. Nor should resource extraction:
affect negatively, in principle, the more traditional sectors of the econom=y, since
it does not compete with them for scarce inputs .
Neverthele-ss the experience of the last few years indicates that oil
exporting countries have not fared as well as the above reasoning would
predict ; this includes industrial as well as developing oil exporters . For
example, the possibly harmful effect of resource exports on the domestic economy
has featured on the economic agendas of the United Kingdom, Holland and Australia,
being variously referred to as the industrialisation phenonem, the Dutch disease
and the Gregory syndrome . Resource exports seem to have a 'knack' for affect-
ing the domestic economy of the oil exporter in ways
that can only be per-
ceived when a general equilibrium analysis is carried
out . This is not because
resource exports compete for scarce resources and affect factor prices in
this manner but rather, it appears, because they affect sometimes perversely
the relative prices of traditional and industrial goods .
	
Factor prices
(labor and capital) are thus also affected, but from the demand rather than
from the supply side .
A resource exporter may find that the expansion of its exports undermines
its subsistence economy (e .g . domestic food output) and thus its domestic
demand structure, through its negative impact on the domestic "terms of trade"
between. industry and agriculture . Thus domestic consumption and overall
employment and output in the more traditional sectors may all decrease . This
appears familiar in the light of the recent experience of several oii expo=tinC7
countries (e.g . Venezuela, Iran, Mexico) . In addition, depending on the
characteristics of the importing economy, increased resource exports may also
bring about worse terms of trade and even lower real export revenues as the
international price of their industrial imports rises . Therefore, the voltr:e
of industrial goods traded for resources may also decrease . In order to keep
the previous level of industrial consumption (or investment),the resource
exporting country may therefore have to produce more industrial goods
domestically, thus compounding the negative aspects 'of the scenario .
The aim of this paper is to explore the general macro characteristics of
the trading economies that can help us understand whether a certain export policy
is likely to improve welfare, international terms of trade and real revenues of
the exporter, or worsen all or some of these variables . The conditions under wt
one or the other outcome can be expected may yield useful information, since
these may be the subject of policy within the exporting country .
The interest of the results lies in the simple as well as somewhat
unexpected answers to some of these questions . Dual developing economies
that use very few capital and resource inputs in their traditional sector and
trade resources for industrial goods with a more homogeneous industrial
economy with high rates of profit,will in general find their domestic welfare
negatively affected by increased resource exports, together with their terms of
trade and export revenues .
	
Yet, even as export revenues decrease
total profit income and the rate of profit may improve within the resource
exporting economy, perhaps explaining why trade takes place at all in these
cases . With more integrated economies and more homogeneous technologies,
the domestic welfare impact of increased oil exports will in general be positive
for the oil exporter, even as its terms of trade worsen with increased exports .
The most positive result for the exporter is achieved when it trades with a
dual economy . Here its real revenues will in general increase as it increases
export vol=es, but the welfare impact on the domestic economy of the oil
.importer may be less positive in these cases .
Clearly much work is needed to elucidate some of the most .puzzling
macro problems , associated with resource - exporting economies . In paxticular,
the , role of exchange rates seems rather crucial, at least in short term
behaviour. The usual defence for not including money will be invoked here :
the sake of simplicity and the implicit belief that at least in the medium run
real variables are the most important in explaining market behaviour as well as
welfare, In any case, the argument goes, it Tiay be better to understand
first the 'real' aspects of the problem.
Another useful extension would be to incorporate the dynamic aspects of
oil exports problems thus taking into consideration the intertemporal
decision . making of an oil exporter in relation to the returns on other
assets (i .e . capital) as in Hotelling type models, e .g . E~ .
Finally, it could be useful to explore the possible changes of these
results if one allows for a balance of payment surplus of the resource
exporter,and assumes that at least part of this export surplus is reinvested
in the importing economy, as in [7].
II A Macro model-of-Resource Trading Economies
We shall discuss here the general characteristics of the macro model,
and the main results in relation to previous work .
The macro model of each region is of a general equilibrium type,
consistent with that of a competitive market economy. The international
resource market behaviour is as follows . A volume of resource exports is
determined 1 (which may not exceed a given bound) ; in a world equilibrium
	
the
North's domestic (general equilibrium) reaction to this oil export volume
determines the price of industrial goods which the North exports, as well as
the volume of these exports . The relative international price of resources is
then determined in equilibrium by the relative volumes of resources and of
industrial exports . This price may therefore be positive even if resource
exports from the South(plus the South's domestic . consumption) do not exhaust
1 The determination of the volume of exports of resources is exogenous in
the sense that the general equilibrium of the model is completely determined up
to a level of these exports . Whether the level of resource exports is determined
by policies of the South or of the North, is immaterial for the results .
the given bound on available resources .
'
	
Each region produces and consumes two corm-iodities, basic consumption
and industrial goods, with three factors of production, resources, capital
and labor . Therefore there are five markets in each region, and, in
equilibrium,five (endogenously determined) prices . The levels of output,
consumption and employment, as well as international trade levels, are all
determined endogenously at the world equilibrium .
Industrial goods are traded internationally in exchange for resources . In
a world equilibrium internationally traded commodity prices are equal in both
regions . However, different technologies in each region imply that other
factor prices (labor and capital) may be different across regions, even though
they are equal across sectors in each region .
It is of interest that a crucial condition behind the results on gains
and losses from resource trade discussed above is the same that explains
gains or losses from trade in basic goods in a previous paper,
Chichilnisky [4], i .e . a form of technological du-zlity represented by to
sign of the inequality D - 2w < O, where D relates to the level of technologicalPB
duality in the economy and W is the real wage . If the importer has the oppositePB
condition namely more homogeneous technologies > 2W ) and a high rate ofD PB
profit D < 2r then the cross equilibria relation between oil exports and
their (relative) price is shown here to be downward sloping, as it was the
case for the exports for basic consumption goods in [ 4
Thus under these conditions increases in resource exports will necessarily
be accompanied by worse terms of trade for the exporter in terms of industrial
goods . This may occur even if the increase in exports is determined by an in-
crease in the (equilibrium) amount for oil demanded by the North . As will be seen
in the proof of theorem 1, the sign of the expression
c2
	
2w- determines
the slope of the relation between rates of procits and real wages across
equilibrium. This can be regarded as indicating the degree of homogeneity
of the economy, i .e . the extent to which the rewards to capital and labor
move together, or in opposition . This relates to the finding of 4 1 in that
the condition of duality c2 -
2w
< O was seen to bring about factor price
' D PB
inequalisation as exports of basic goods increased .
However, the similarity with the results in [4] does not go much further,
essentially because an important factor in those results is that the export good
is very labor intensive and is also the domestic'wage'good, which accounts for
the bulk of wage income consumption. These characteristics definitely do not
apply to resources . Here, instead, resources are mostly used
domestically as an input to industrial goods, wage income is spent on a
basic consumption goods which is not internationally traded . The South
exports an input of production rather'than a consumption good , and the export
activity is not labor intensive .
III ' ~pecificaticn of the Macro Yjodel
There are two regions called the 'North' and the 'South' . Each region
produces two conmlodities : a basic consumption good B and a luxury/investment
good denoted I (also called the 'industrial' good), and in addition the South
produces a resource, v:hi.ch from now on we shall call oil, deneted .8 . Gods
B and I are consumed ; oil is an input of production . The other two inputs are
capital K and labour, L. The North exports industrial goods in exchange for
oil from the South.
We shall first specify the model of one region, the South . The
production system is formalised by the equations :
(1)
	
BS	= min (LB/al, 8B/bl, KB/c1)
= a(w)
pB
(3) L
(a) K = $r
min(LI /a2 , 8
I
/b2 , KI/c2 ),(2)
IS
where the superscripts on these indicate the sectors,and a constraint on
oil supplies
0S
The supply of factors K and L are price dependent, . given by the following
relations
where w denotes wages, r the rate of profit or quasi rent of capital and pB
the price of B .
In equilibrium we postulate the following deu:and behaviour .
where L is total labor employed ,
i.e . B is a 'wage good' . Equation (5) is only valid in equilibrium ; no
disequilibrium demand behaviour is stipulated as we are only concerned here
with behaviour across equilibria . While (5) simplifies the computations, it
can be seen not to be crucial to the results of this paper : all that is required
is that the proportion of wage income spent in the industrial good is
significantly lower than that of profit income .
From the production relations (1) and (2) one obtains the demand for
labour and capital when factors are efficiently used
(6)
	
LD = BSa 1 + ISa2
(7) KD = BSc1 + ISc2
These can be considered as a system of two linear equations in two unknowns,
BS and IS , from which one obtains, in equilibrium :
(8) BS = (c 2L - a 2K)/D
and
(9) c
1vD
Where D is the determinant of the matrix of technical coefficients
a
l
Let the super indices S and D denote supply and demand at the equilibrium of
the South . Then the solutions of the model are given by the equilibrium con-
ditions -
(10) KD = KS , i .e . cIB S + c2 IS = Rr,
(11) LD = LS . i . e . a BS + a IS = a
w
~" LO-
(12) BD = BS , i .e . w L = (c L - a K) /
pB	2 2 D
(13) ID = IS + XD , where XD denotes imports of I
(14) 0S = OD A- X0 = b1BS + b2 I S + X0~
S
Where X8 denotes exports of oil,
(15)
	
balance of payments :
p
XS _ p XD
0 0 I I
and the national income identity (Walras Law in equilibrium)
(16)
pBBD + pIID = wL + rp IK + p00, where 0 denotes total oil
inputs supplied in equilibrium .
Equivalently, (16) can be written as
(16') pBBD + pI(IS + X1) = wL + rpLK + p(OD0 + X0
where 0D denotes the amount of oil inputs employed in the region,
OD = OS - X0
. Equations ;16') and (16) are identical in equilibrium .
Note that for given values of the international trade variables (pot PI, X
S
and X
D
I )
the solutions to the model of the domestic economy of the South are given by
7 equations ((10) to (16)) in eight unknowns : L, K, B, I S , 0S,
PB,
r and w.
The model of the North is specified similarly to that of the South, but
for some stylised characteristics (described by parameter values), which are
discussed in the following sections, and the assumption that 0 = 0, i .e . the
North produces no oil domestically .
The 2-region model is therefore specified by two sets of 14 equations plus the
following four international trade equilibrium relations (the indices N and S
in parenthesis are used to distinguish variables for the North and South
when needed) :
(17) p (N) = p (S)0 0
(18) PI (N) = p I (S)
(1~) XO (S) = XO (N)
and
(20)
	
XI (N) = XD (S) .
Note, however, that in view of the balance of payments condition (15), only
three of the four equations (17), (18), (19) and (20) are indeperdent, for
instance, (20) is always satisfied when (15), (17), (18) and (19) are . For
the two-region North--South model we have therefore a system of 1.7 independent
equations : 7 for each region and 3 for the international market . The
endogenous variables of the North-South model are : 8 :domestic variables of
the South (K, L, B . 1S , O S , r, w, PB ) ;7 for the North (same as for the South but
with OS=0), and 4 international market variables : po, PI , XG, XI, making a
total of 19 . Since there are 17 equations and 19 variables, for each value
of a given variable, say, the volume of resource exports X0, the solutions
of the model are in principle locally unique in relative prices . 1t will
be shown below that this is indeed the case, and therefore that as the
oil exports vary, the equilibria of the North-South model describe a one
parameter family. Along this our comparative statics exercises will be carried
out in t3-ie following sections .
IV - Solving the 'Y.)del
This section will find explicit solutions to the model, showing in
particular that the set of equilibria describe a one parameter family . The
material of this section will also be useful in the study of the welfare
effects of oil export policies of the following sections .
In the following, oil will be the considered numeraire, i .e . p = .~1
We shall first explore.the relationships between factor markets and
the domestic market for basic consumption goods in each region . These
domestic markets will be linked, in turn,-with the international markets for
oil and industrial goods .
Consider now the equilibrium relation BD - BS = O.
FYom (3) and (5) in equilibrium
(21) BD
and from (4) (5) and (8)
(22)
i .e .
(23)
	
BS	- BD (act
w
- Ba2r) /D- a (W) 2 = O.
pBp B
This is a quadratic expression in w/pB ,
whose roots are
(24)
Therefore, (24) gives two equilibrium values of real wages for each given rate
of profit in equilibrium, as well as an upper bound for r, in each region :
(25) r
w/p
= 2/2D + ( c2_l - 2
B 2D/ aD
2
c2 a
40a2D.
a( ) 2P,
B
(26) XD = ID - Imo.
- 1 3-
(c2L - a2K)/D	= (act P - Ra2r)/D~- B
(27) XI (S) .
= r K + PO 8 - IS (s) .
I .
Note that the smaller :root of w/pB in (24)-is an increasing function of r, and
-the larger, a decreasing function of r .
We next study the relationship between domestic and international markets .
Consider the equation for imports of I, XD . Across the equilibria of the
South, by definition
I
By the national income identity (15) and the demand condition (5), we
obtain the following equation for imports of Yndustrial goods in equilibrium :
Now, across equilibria pz XD(S) - p0
XS (S) because of the balance of payments
condition .
	
Since 0 = 0D	+ XS, we therefore obtain in an equilibrium of
the South :
(28) r K + p0
p
0D - IS = O. Substituting in (28) the equations
I
for supply of labour and capital (3) and (4), and (9) for supply of I,
(28) gives the following implicit relation between the international
equilibrium price of industrial goods, pI , and the domestic factor prices
(rate of profit and real wages) in the South :
(29) or
- 14-
(r + D
(P2 - 1) ) + aP
(
P
pl -- D
(p2 - 1)
I B B I I
Since as we saw in (24), w-- .i s a (two branched) function of r, substituting
PB
(24) into (29) one obtains an. expression relating the rate of profit of the
South r(s) and the international price of industrial goods,
equilibria .
XD(N), Recalling th~.t the North does not produce oil, we obtain the equilibriin
relation .
(30) , XD (N) = I S	- ID= (a1 K - cl L) /D - r K
For the North, consider the equation for exports of industrial goods
- (alr - r2) - cl w
where the parameters and variables refer now to the North .
O .
across
We shall now show that for each given value of oil exports from the South
X0(S),the North - South general equilibrium model is 'closed', and a
solution can be given analytically.
- 1 5-
Since X8 (S)
	
= X8 (N) in equilibrium, from (14)r(3) and (4) one obtains an
expression relating exports of oil and factor prices in the North:
S6abr cb
(31) X8 (S) = D
2 + a ( bl	 p
B B
(the right hand side refers to variables and parameters of the North) .
Therefore for each level of oil exports, (31) gives an implicit relation
wbetween two factor prices in the North r (N) and --- (N) .
pB
Together with equation (24), which gives another (independent) implicit
relation between these factor prices w (N) and r(N), we can therefore obtain
PB* wthe equilibrium values r(N) and -- (N)* corresponding -to each given oil
pB
export volume XS (S) .
From equations (3) and (4) one then obtains total employment of labor and
capital L(N) * and K(N) * . Equations (8) and (9) are then used to compute
* *
the output of the consumption good B in equilibrium B (N) ., and that 'of 1,Z(N) .
From (31) we determine exports of industrial goods XS (N) . From equation (14) we 'hen
determine the demand for oil from the North 6 D (N) *. , and using the balance of payments
condition, 6D (N)
*
= X
S
6 (S)
* = pI XS
(N) * , we obtain the international
*
equilibrium price of industrial goods pI ,
Finally, we consider the following two price equations (for the North)
which derive directly from the production relations (1) and (2) under the
assumption o£ competitive use of factors:
(32)
and
(33)
PB= a1w+b1p0+c1 rPI .
=a2 w+b2 p0 +c2 rpl .
- 16-
Recalling that oil is assumed to be the numeraire, since both pl (N)
	
and
r(N) are already known, we can obtain the nominal wage w(N) from (33) and then
from (32), the equilibrium price of B,pB(N), as well . This completes the
computation of an equilibrium for the North, for each given volume of oil
exports Xe (S) .
We now compute the equilibrium for the South, .noting that for each given XS (S)
we have already determined the level of imports of the South, . since XDD (S) _
1~N) in equilibrium,snd also the international equilibrium price for
these imports pI . Equations (24) and (29), give therefore two (independent)
relations between real wages and the rate of profit of the South, whose
equilibrium values we can then compute,. (S) * and r(S) * . From equations
* B *
(32) and (33) we_then obtain pB (S) and w(S) ; from (3) and (4) K(S) and
L (S) . from (8) and (9) 1 (S) * and BS (S) and from (14) _ © (S) *, This
.01
completes the computation of a general equilibrium of the North-South model.
Note that for each level of oil exports XS(S) there will exist in. general more
than one solution for the North-South model, depending on the initial
' parameter values anc: the characteristics of both economies, but only a finite
number, i .e. the solutions are locally unique . Therefore, as the scalar
XS (S) varies, ~ o obtain (locally) a one-parameter family of equilibrium,, which
shall be studied in some detail in the following section . Note also that at some
equilibrium a level of oil supplies below the feasible bound 8 may be obtained .
This can be seen as follows . For each level of oil exports from the South
XS (S), .from the equilibria of the North (computed as above) we obtain the level
of imports of industrial goods XDD (S) * and their equilibrium price p *,
2
Given these two variables, .the domestic supply of basic and industrial goods
-17-
S* S*
in the South is then determined, _B
	
and I , and then, .tl-ie domestic
demand for oil in the South 8D = b1 BS + b2 BS . The feasibility condition
requires that XS(S) + 0
D
(S) < 0, but the above computation of total oil
used does not imply that all the oil potentially produced is extracted,
i .e . Xe(S) + 0D (S) < 8 is in principle possible . It is of interest, .
however, to remark that the fact that even though there may be "excess supply"
of oil in equilibrium  the relative price of oil need not be zero because of
the fact that the relative price of oil is determined by the international market
equilibrium condition,
PO
PI
XI (N)
X8 (N)
I .e . the model assumes a "passive" determination of relative oil prices
by international real markets .
We shall now explore the welfare properties of a move towards a new
world trade equili`-)rium with a higher level of oil exports from the South,
As we shall see, certain characteristics of the economies of the North and
of the South may affect rather strinkingly the outcome of such export
policies, in terms of relative prices and the volume of industrial goods
traded, as well as the real wages, and the overall consumption and employment
of factors in both regions . We shall then be able to study the advantages
d disadvantages of oil export policies, by focusing on the policy parameters
that determine the welfare effects of such policies .
This section proves the main results analytically ; possible policy
implications are discussed later in the next section . The following stylized . .
assumptions are now made on the technologies of both regions :
A.1
	
D = alc2 - a2cl > b in both regions, i .e . the industrial good
is relatively more capital intensive and the basic consumption good
more labor intensive.
A.2 The South's basic consumption uses mostly labor and very few oil and
In the South
large.
C .2
capital inputs, .i .e . bl and cl are relatively small in the South.
A .3 E = b1a2 - b2 al > O in the North, i .e . the North's basic. good is
relatively more oil intensive and the industrial good more labor
intensive (or they have approximately similar intensities in oil
and labor both) .
A .3 is a natural assumption e .a . when the "non-traded" good B in the
North are services or certain manufactures, and the good I consists of consumer
durables, vehicles, . military equipment, etc . As it will be seen below, this
assumption is not necessary to obtain the results, but it simplifies
significantly the computations .
We can now prove
Theorem 1
Assume that the economies . of the North and of the South are as specified
in Sections II and III, and the following conditions are satisfied.
c2 2w - a1 < 2rD
-.< -
D pB
In the North
C2 > 2w
D pB
e.g . the technology is 'dualistic' in its use of capital and labor, and thus D is
e.g . there is a relatively homogeneous technology, and the . rate of. profit is
relatively high so that 2r > alD
- 1 9-
	
_
Then a rnmve towards a new world equilibrium with increased oil exports
will necessarily worsen the terms of trade of the South and decrease its
real, revenues. Real wages, total employment and the domestic consumption
of basic goods wilt all decrease in the South .
Within the North, the new equilibrium produces more employment, and
increases both. the real wages and the domestic consumption of basic goods .
The rate of profit and total profit income increase in both regions with
increases in oil exports .
Proof :
The strategy of the proof is as follows . First we show that under
the conditions an increase in oil imports by the North raises the .
domestic rate of profit r(N) across equilibria . Next we show that as
this rate of profit raises, the volume of the exports of industrial goods
from the North XS (N) falls across equilibria e due to income effects in the
North . This implies that in a world equilibrium with a higher volume of
oil exports from the South, the industrial goods exports
will necessarily decrease . Thus the terms of trade of the South will worsen
and its real revenue (in terms of industrial goods) will fall as oil
exports increase . The rest of the proof then traces the welfare impact
of-this international market behaviour on the domestic economies of the
North and the South.
We establish in the first place that the rate of profit in the North
r(N) increases with the volume of oil exports by the South, i .e .
ax") (S)
> O .
3r(N)
Note that the fact that po - 1, and both w/rB and r increase in the North
does not imply that all factor prices move in the same direction in the North,
since -we are considering here .real wage's w/pB deflated by the price of the good
B, which is not the numeraire .
Consider the equation for oil imports by the North X8 (N) .
	
Since
the North produces no oil, X8 (N) - 6
D
(N) . In equilibrium, of course
S XD (N)
Xe (N) -* X8 (S) , so that is sufficies to find the sign of 3 6
3 r (N)
Now the total volume of oil demanded by the North is the sum of oil demanded
in the industrial sector I and in the sector of basic goods B;
(34) 9 (N) a Xe(N) s b2 I + bl BS .
In order to find the relationship between oil imports and the rate of profit
in the North we now write IS and BS as a function of total factors (labor
and capital) employed ;
(35) X8 (N)
so that
b
2
D
b
2
D
(al K
- 2 0-
(a1 K = c1 L) + bl a ( w ) 2 .
B
where we have made use of equations (5), (8) and (9) . Since factors
employed depend on their prices, ((3) and (4)) we obtain
b a Cl b(36) X8 (N) = B D 1 r + a`bl (p) 2 - P D 2 .
(37) 3x8 (N) = Salb2 + a b 2w - clb2
3r (N)
D 1 pB	D
In order to determine the- sign of (37) we next study that. of
3w/P B (N)
3r (N)
B B
3w/p B
3r
(39)
Now, from equation (24) we can obtain an expression relating the
changes in real wages and in the rates of profit in the North,
aw/%(N)
	
_ aa2(38) Dr (N)
_
c2 2w
D a ~ D_pB~
Substituting (37) into ( 38) and rearranging terms one obtains :
(30), we have
Zr (N) c2 _ _2w_ pBD(
D PB
which in view of assumptions A .2 and C .2, is a positive expression . Therefore,
the rate of profit in the North increases with the volume of oil exports
across equilibria. Note that (39) could also be positive when E < O . Since
the assumption E > O is only used in this pert of the proof, this shows that it
is not strictly necessary for the results .
Next we consider the relation between the rate of profit in the North
aXS (N)
.r(N) and the volume of its exports of industrial goods, I From equation
Dr (N)
(40) _aXI (i4) al 2 r cl
	` aw/pB
ar(N) S (D ~
a D ' ar~
and we shall now discuss the sign of both terms in the right hand side in order
to determine that of (40) .
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From (38) and assumption C .?_, the rate of profit and the real wage in the North
are positively related, i .e .
to income effects within the North .
Together with equation
- 2 2-
aw/PB
	
a
" > O. Furthermore, since by C .2 D <2r, both terms in the right hand
ar
side of (40) are negative . It follows that as
exports from the North decrease, i .e .
(39), (41) implies
axS(N) axD(S)
(42) _ < O, i .e .
aXe (N) axe (S)
A
the rate of profit r(N)
axS (N)
(41) I < 0 Since the supply of industrial goods I S is an
increases
ar(N)
increasing function of r, and
XI
= I S - ID , it follows that as . r(N) increases,
the demand for industrial goods in the North increases proportionately more
than its supplyIunder the assumptions . Thus the negative sign of (41) is due
there is a negative association between the volume of oil exports and that of
industrial imports across equilibria in our case .
Since XS (S) = p XD(S), we have thus shown that
I
(43)
axe (S)
apI
i .e . a move towards a world equilibrium with increased oil exports of the
South increases the relative price of industrial goods, i .e . worsens the terms
of trade of the South . Furthermore by (42) the volume of industrial imports
of the South XI (S) = XI(N) decreases with the volume of oil exported, so that
the real revenues obtained by the oil exporter, in terms of industrial goods,
have decreased as well . This completes the proof of the international market
results of an increase of oil exports .
We now study the welfare implications of such an increase in oil exports
on the domestic economies of the North and of the South. The proof will
proceed by tracing the impact of the higher (relative) price of industrial
goods p l which accompany larger exports of oil on both economies .
	
Linder the
assumptiors,the rate of profit r(S) of the South will be seen to be positively
related to
the international price of industrial goods pI . However, because of the duality
condition C .1, the rate of profit in the South r(S) is negatively correlated with
real wages, employment and domestic consumption of B across equilibria of the
South . This will then establish the stated effects on welfare of the South of
increases in oil exports under the conditions of this theorem.
As technologies are relatively more homogeneous in the North, an increase
in the rate of profit of the North r(N) is seen to be associated, instead, with
higher real wages, employment and domestic consumption of B in the North . This will
complete the proof of the theorem.
We study next the relation between the international price of industrial
goods ~I and the rate of
profit in the South r(S) .
Firstly, note that as the rate of profit increases, total capital
available in the South increases, and therefore so does the supply of
industrial goods,which are capital intensive . Formally, 'since
and K = ~r (from 4), we have
(45)
= (al K - cl L) /D
a3S __ Sal _ cl
(ILar D D ,ar}
aw/pB
az
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which is positive since by the duality condition and (38),
South.
As the supply of industrial goods I S increase with r, so does the demand for
oil in the South,since B uses very few oil inputs (b 1 small),and oil demand is :
(46)
r, since
(48)
(49)
when cl is small .
apI > O .
ar (S)
8D (S)
	
= b
'2,
IS + b
1
BS . Therefore,
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Finally, from (28) the price of industrial goods is
8D
(47) pI
_-
S ;I -rK
d we shall now check that it increases with r .
1
2~§ the rate of profit in the South exceeds D (C .1), the
difference between industrial output and the return on capital decreases with
a c aw/
ar_
(IS _ rK) (D. - 2r) -a D arB
Therefore, as r(S) increases, the denominator of (47) decreases and the
numerator increases . It follows, .in particular i that the international price of
I industrial goods is positively associated with the rate of profit in the
a
aw/ps
Dr < O in the
This implies that increases in oil exports are accompanied by :a higher rate
of profit in the South.
_25_
Now, by duality (C.1) and (38), such an increase in r(S) has the
opposite effect on real wages :
p
(S) will decrease with oil exports .
g
From (3) this implies that total employment decreases in the South as
well, and thus since BD = wL (by 5) it follows that the consumption of basic
goods in the South decreases as well .
The welfare impact of increased oil exports on the economy of the North are
the opposite .
	
Since as exports of oil X
S
(S) increase the rate of profit , in the
North r(N) increases (by (39)), and this rate of profit r(N) is positively
associated to real wages (by C.2 and 38), it follows that both factor prices
(for labor and capital)increase in the North with oil imports . As real wages
w/p.(N) increase, by (3) total employment of labor L(N) increases in tjie North
implying that total consumption of basic goods in the North, BD .-_ a1PB/
(by (5) and (3)) also increases .
This completes the proof of the theorem .
In. view of the negative welfare effects' on "the South of increased
oil exports, it seems natural to enquire whether an economy with the
characteristics of the South in theorem 1 will export oil at all . One
possible answer is that such an economy may export oil because the welfare
effects of increased oil exports are not the same across all income groups :
as seen above both the rate of profit and the total profits income of the
South increase with increases in oil exports, even as total real revenues
of the region as a whole decrease . The next corollary sharpens this result
to exhibit more clearly the role of the conditions of theorem 1 on the
welfare of different income groups .
Carollary_ 2
Consider a move towards .a new world equilibrium with increased oil
exports from the South and lower real export revenues .
	
Then if the
economy of the South has the characteristics of theorem 1 both the rate
of profit and the total profit income of the South will have increased at
the new equilibrium, and this is independent of the characteristics of the
economy of the North.
Proof
Consider a new equilibrium with increased oil exports, in which real
X6 (Sd )
revenues of the South have decreased, D < O.
aXI (S)
This implies that the relative price of industrial goods pI have
increased in the new equilibria, i .e . the terms of trade of the South have
worsened .From (4°) this implies that the -rate of profit in the South r(S)
has increased . Since by (4) K = (3r, total capital employed also increases
in the South. Therefore since r, pI and K increased, the total profit
income r pI K will necessarily have increased as well, completinc. the proof
of the corollary .
We now explore conditions under which more positive welfare effects
on the South can be expected from increases in oil exports . The next
results highlights the role of technologies of the South in the determination
of welfare effects of oil export policies :
Theorem 2
Assume that the economies of the North and the South are as in theorem
l, except that the condition of dual technologies in the South D < 2wi g
Proof
is replaced
c2
D
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> 2w , e .g . more homogenous technologies.
	
Then an
P
B
increase in oil exports will worsen the South's terms of trade and decrease
its real revenues, but real wages, e,-rpZoument and domestic consumption of basic
goods will all increase in the new equilibrium of the Sovth, as well as its
profits . .
An increase in XS will have a negative impact on the equilibrum volume of impor
of industrial goods XD and the South's terms of trade . This is because these
effects depend only on the general equilibrium reaction of the North to
increased oil exports from the South, aid' the Northern economy is assumed to
have the same characteristics as in theorem 1 .
Next, note that as in theorem 1 increases of oil exports XS increase the
rate of profit in the South in this case as well, even though for different
reasons .
From (47)
(50)
PI
e
D
ai c aw/P
ar(S)
(IS - rK) = S(D - 2r ) - aD 9Dr
has a negative sign
'7
and the expression
° In this case the expression
ae __ _D aIS (S) al . cl aw/pB
3r(S) - bl ar(S) (D
_ a
D ar )
aw/P _B
ar(S)
D PB .
profit .
Sa2
with two major exceptions :
c
i .e.
	
- 2wD < O,pB
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i' s positive when cl is small . It follows that the rate of profit'r(S)
increases with oil exports because as seen above 3XS (S) > O .
2pI
Now, consider equation (38), that determines the relation between the
rate of profit r(S) and the real wage in the South .
When technologies are relatively homogeneous in the South, so that
1 > 2w this derivative is positive, so that real wages increase with the rate of
Therefore, as oil exports increase, so do real wages. From (3)
employment in the South also increases, and from (5) domestic consumption of B
increases as well . This completes the proof .
Fl.nally, we explore condition . : under which the real revenues of the oil
exporter can be expected to improve with higher volumes of exports . Here we
must of course require different characteristics of the oil importer than those
of theorem 1 . We have the following:
Theorem 3
Assume that the oil i;rrporter has the characteristics of theorem 1
L its technologies are-relatively dual,
2. its basic goods sector uses relatively few capital inputs, - cl ti o.
Proof
ax,
ar
axSI
ar
Then an increase in oil exports will increase the real revenues of the
oil exporter and improve its terms of trade.
	
Within the oil importing country,
the rate of profits and the domestic use of industrial goods both decrea- but
real wages, employment and consumption of basic goods all increase in
the new equilibrium .
Under the conditions of this theorem from equation (39)
which implies that the rate of profit decreases in the oil importing country
as its imports of oil increase .
From equation (40) , since c1 'L O, we obtain
D pB
_2w
PB
improve with increased oil exports.
c
From (45) and the fact that D
E
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2r
cl a ; .r
, - aD PB ) < O,(
ar
0 .
which implies that the volume of industrial goods exports increase with oil
imports, across equilibria . Thus, the real revenues of the oil importer
Since c2 - `w is now negative within the oil importing country, from
(38) and (3) and (5) lower rates of profits are associated to higher real
wages, employment and domestic consumption of basic goods .
O, it follows that the domestic
- 3 0-
supply of industrial goods, IS , has now decreased .
industrial goods I D equals IS - XI, exports
decreased, the new equilibrium volume of industrial
is lower . This completes the proof .
VI
	
Discussion and Conclusions
Since domestic use of
XI have increased, and output IS
goods used domestically ID
The results suggest that differences in certain macro characteristics of the
trading economies will lead to rather different outcomes of resource export
policies . This section will summarise our findings and suggest ways in which they
1 1,
may be useful in the analysis of policy.
A first result indicates that when our specification
In the first place we shall discuss the impact of the general equilibrium
responses of the resource importing region on international markets .
of the trading economies is applicable, then both the terms of trade and the
export revenues of the resource exporter can be expected to worsen as the
volume of its exports expands when the importing economy has the following
stylized characteristics : a technologically homogeneous, integrated
economy with a relatively high rate )f profit, and where capital and resource
intensities in the industrial and consumption goods sectors are relatively
similar . This result is less than immediate, and may be worth discussing its
causes .
Firstly we note that as real revenues of the resource exporter are
measured in terms of industrial goods, this result establishes that at a new
equilibrium a higher volume of resources will be traded for a lower volume of
industrial goods . The worsening of the terms of trade follows : the
relative price of industrial goods will necessarily increase at the
world equilibrium . This clearly implies the existence of a negative
- 3 1-
correlation across equilibria between the price of industrial goods,' and their
volume of exports from the industrial economy . This negative correlation is
similar to that demonstrated in[ 4 ], but in that case, it was valid only for thf
exports of labor intensive basic consumption goods from a developing country .
Both cases, however, are due to general equilibriuun income effects as shown in
(4) and discussed below,
'
	
As the proof of theorem 1 demonstrates, under the appropriate conditions, th
income effect of a price change of industrial goods is stronger
than the price effect within the industrial economy . This is an effect that
can only be observed in a general equilibrium model : As the price of
industrial goods _rises, their domestic supply increases, but their domestic
demand increases and relatively more, thus lowering the surplus available for
exports . Now, since a higher volume of oil exports is shown (in theorem 1) to
be associated with higher profits in the industrial economy, and an increase
in profit income increases the domestic demand for industrial goods,
the final result is that higher volumes of oil exports are associated with
lower volumes of industrial exports .
The welfare effects on the industrial economy of its improved international
situation are positive : since the economy is rather homogeneous and
integrated, the increased domestic demand and supply for industrial goods leads
to higher levels of overall employment, real wages, and consumption of
both goods . The impacts of increased resource imports are thus unambiguousl;
positive for such an industrial economy .
Eowever, these results are reversed when the resource importing economy
is less homogeneous, has a "'dual" technological structure, and uses few
capital and resource inputs in its basic consumption good sector . These are
characteristics more appropriate, perhaps, for a developing resource _importing
economy. in this latter case, as resources imports increase,
- 3 2-
the exporter can expect higher real revenues and better terms of trade .
The impact of higher resource imports on the 'importing economy are however
less positive .
	
This is demonstrated in theorem 3 by tracing the
general equilibrium effects symmetric to those of theorem 1 . The importing
country's rate of profit and the volume of industrial goods it uses at the
new equilibrium , are both lower . However, real wages, employment and
consumption of basic goods increase at the new equilibrium of the importing
country. Increased resource imports seem to lead to tae-industrialisation'
in this case, a more basic consumption/production oriented economy.
The previous discussion dealt with impacts of increased exports of resources c
the importing country and on the international economy . We shall now discuss the
impact of these international markets changes on the resource exporter .
in symmetry with the above results, differences in
the degree of technological dualism and of lack of integration in the exporting
region also lead here to rather different results .
Theorem 1 explores the case where the resource exporting economy has a
dual technology, uses few capital and resource inputs in its basic consumption
sector, and has initially a relatively high rate of profit. In this case ,
increases in resource export volumes increase domestic profits and total
profit income, This occurs aven as the export revenues of the region as a whole
fall .
Yet, due to the dualism and lack of integration of this economy, these
increased profits lead to lower levels of employment, real wages and wage
income, and a decreased output and consumption of basic goods within the
resource exporting economy . As a matter of fact, in order to keep the previous
level of domestic consumption of industrial goods, the region must now
increase its domestic output, since its imports have decreased . The
- 3 3-
only gain of increased resource exports is in the increase of profit-income .
These results are traced in theorem 1, where, as in F
	
4 1, the general
equilibrium income effects are shown to depend significantly on the
conditions of dualism of the economy . This appears more sharply in Corollary
2, which explores these results taking into consideration the characteristics
of the exporting economy only .
The overall conclusion is that,under the conditions, an integrated and
homogeneous importing economy may benefit unambiguously from increased
exports of resources from an exporting region which has a dual economy_
For the resource exporter, necessary conditions for benefitting from
increased resource trade seems to be to trade with similar economies, and to
keep its economy as integrated and homogeneous as possible .
Under the conditions studied here, a region that exports resources for
which it has no use in the bulk of its economy (the subsistence sector) and
whose exports proceeds mostly benefit its smaller internationally
linked industrial sector, can only see its international position worsen in the
long term if it trades with a homogeneous industrial economy. Due to a
negative effect on domestic terms of trade the welfare impacts on its
subsistence sector will be negative . This occurs even when there is no
competition for scarce inputs between the subsistence and the resource
sectors, and even though labor is also employed in the industrial
sector. The revenues from resource exports translate in this case
into higher profit income that does not necessarily 'circulate' through the
economy, and tend to raise the prices for the imported indust-ial good,
without necessarily bringing about welfare improvements .
As stated in Section . l, a number of extensions and improvements on this
model seem possible and desirable, in particular, some of the dynamic aspects
of the problem may be usefully developed.
2 .
	
Bliss, C . "Macro-economics of Open Economics" . Paper delivered at the
Association of University Teachers of Economics, Loughborough, 1981 .
3 . Chichilnisky, G. "Oil prices, Industrial Prices and Output: A General
Equilibrium macro analysis" . Paper_ delivered at the Association of
University Teachers of Economics, Loughborough, 1981 .
4 . Chichilnisky, G . "Terms of Trade and Domestic Distribution : Expert Led Growth
with Abundant Labour" . Journal of Development Economics, 1981 .
5 . Corden, W. H. Inflation, Exchange Rates and the World Economy, University of
Chicago Press 1971 .
6 . Dasgupta, P . S . and Heal, G. M. Economic Theory an d Exhaustible Resources
Nisbet/Cambridge University Press (1979) .
-34--
REFERENCES
Benavie, A . "Foreign Prices and Income in a Macromodel with Two Domestic
Sectors" . International Economic Review 1978 .
sgt `a, P . S ., Eastwood R. K., and Heal, G . M.
Trading Economy",
_quarterly Journal of Economics , 1978 .
"Resource Depletion in
